# F1 — Business School / Management
*3 ACF® pedagogical cases for Master's, Grande École (French top-tier business school) and Specialized Master's (MS) programs in management.*

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## F1-C1 — Multi-Market Dynamic Pricing: The Agent That Adjusts While You Sleep

### Identity

| | |
|---|---|
| **Level** | Master's Year 1 / Year 2 / Grande École final cycle |
| **Recommended duration** | 4 h (2h autonomous analysis + 1h30 production + 30 min presentation) |
| **Format** | Team of 4-5, presentation to a simulated executive committee |
| **Final deliverable** | 5-page framing memo + 15 min presentation to a panel acting as the Executive Committee |

### Brief

**MAISON LAVANDE — lifestyle, beauty & home group.** 612 stores (France, Benelux, Italy, Spain, Germany, UK), e-commerce site in 11 countries. Revenue €1.24 B (2025). Average gross margin 52%, average online basket €87, 14 million monthly visits. Headcount 4,200.

**The context.** The Lunar New Year capsule collection is down 38% in sell-through versus plan. €4.1M of inventory tied up. Marie Lavandier (CEO, 41, former Sephora Digital) pushed last year for the acquisition of **PriceFlux**, a multi-market dynamic pricing agent (Paris-based startup acquired for €18M). PriceFlux is currently in "recommendation" mode: it proposes price adjustments every 4 hours on 38,000 SKUs, validated manually by 6 category managers (average lag 11h, application rate 71%).

Marie wants to **switch PriceFlux to autonomous mode** on 4 pilot segments (selective perfumery, premium facial skincare, home accessories, LNY capsule) with a price window of ±18% around the catalog reference price. Announced objective to the Executive Committee: destock LNY by 60% within 6 weeks, gain 1.2 pts of margin on the 3 other segments within 12 months.

**The tensions.**

- Étienne Vermeer (CCO, 56) refuses "a machine setting prices for our loyal customers. We'll be accused of discrimination."
- Aïcha Bensaïd (DPO) flags regulatory risk: a pricing agent exploiting individual behavioral data raises questions at the intersection of GDPR (Art. 22 automated decision + Art. 5 fairness) and the AI Act (the "high-risk" qualification for B2C retail pricing is not explicitly listed in Annex III, but the European Commission has indicated the list will evolve — outside counsel therefore issues a reserved opinion on the 18-24 month regulatory trajectory).
- Karl Strömgren (VP Retail Germany) cites the **RealPage case** (US — algorithm shared among landlords creating tacit price coordination, DOJ + multi-state lawsuit 2024 under Sherman Act §1), and fears that an agent observing competitor prices across 11 countries could produce unintentional "algorithmic collusion."
- The Pricing team notes that competitors (Sephora, Douglas, Notino) already operate equivalent engines in partial autonomy.
- The CIO recalls that the Knight Capital incident (2012, $440M lost in 45 minutes) remains the benchmark for the **blast radius** of a drifting autonomous system.
- **DDAO Lina Tellier** (Delegated Decision Agent Officer, 39, former ACPR regulator then Compliance Lead at Saint-Gobain Distribution) — appointed 8 months ago reporting directly to the CEO, with a *reasoned right of opposition* on any agent transitioning to autonomous mode at Maison Lavande. Her position: "Without a margin-deviation trigger cap, without an automatic freeze on price variance threshold, and without weekly audit, I oppose the switch to autonomous mode — even at the cost of bearing responsibility for the delay."

### Mission

You are mandated by Marie Lavandier as a **sovereignty audit team** (6-week mission) to answer 3 questions:

1. **Should PriceFlux be switched to autonomous mode on the 4 pilot segments?** (yes / no / yes-but)
2. **If yes, under what governance conditions?** Precise operational framing.
3. **If no, what alternative do you defend before the Executive Committee, which expects the arbitration next week?**

### Documents provided (to be released progressively — Teacher Module)

- PriceFlux technical note (architecture, data mobilized, latency, historical error rate)
- Bredin Prat legal opinion (3 pages, reserved AI Act conclusion)
- 12-month commercial KPIs per segment
- Karl Strömgren memo on RealPage and collusion risk
- VIP customer testimonials (3 emails) on price discrepancies observed in France vs. Belgium on the same product

### ACF tools to mobilize

ACF-00 (Maison Lavande Sovereignty Score) → ACF-01 + ACF-02 (mapping pricing decisions by segment) → ACF-04 + ACF-12 (PriceFlux Mandate) → ACF-11 (Agentic risk assessment) → ACF-06 (Kill switch — 60-second pricing freeze protocol) → ACF-08 (Decision registry) → ACF-13 (practical case synthesis)

### Expected deliverables

1. **ACF-01 / ACF-02 mapping** of the 4 pilot segments — which pricing decisions for which criticalities
2. **Formal PriceFlux Mandate (ACF-12)** — including price window ±X%, auto-trigger conditions, exclusions, scope
3. **Kill switch protocol (ACF-06)** — including automatic triggers (price variance > threshold, margin deviation > threshold, press alert) and shutdown SLA
4. **5-page arbitration memo** to the Executive Committee with reasoned recommendation
5. **12-month monitoring plan (ACF-05 + ACF-09)** — KPIs, audit frequency, improvement cycle
6. **Formal Mandate for DDAO Lina Tellier**: scope of her right of opposition, lifting conditions, real-time data access, frequency of audits she can trigger alone, articulation with the Executive Committee, CEO's recourse path in case of persistent disagreement

### Evaluation grid

Unified 100-pt grid (see README §Grid). Case-specific points of attention:

- **Context understanding (15)**: having identified the 3 tensions (AI Act / collusion / image) without conflating them
- **Relevance of autonomy level (20)**: an "all-or-nothing" deployment must be penalized. A segmented deployment with differentiated autonomy levels (e.g., full autonomy on LNY destocking, co-decision on premium, suggestive on image products) deserves excellence
- **Anticipation of drift (15)**: having cited at least 2 non-trivial failure modes: *price ratcheting* (the agent learns to raise prices without ever lowering), *cross-market arbitrage* (customers purchasing via VPN), *Goodhart on margin* (the agent maximizes margin by sacrificing rotation)
- **Bonus for boldness (10)**: arguing the refusal of autonomous deployment on luxury beauty (the "premium facial skincare" segment) with an economic argument (price-quality signaling margin) and not merely an ethical one earns bonus points

### Analysis insights (teacher-only)

**The trap of the case**: pressure from the Executive Committee pushes toward "yes, let's deploy." The best participants identify that the **real debate is not yes/no but granularity**. On LNY (destocking), the autonomous agent is legitimate (low business criticality, inventory to liquidate, short time window, clear KPI). On premium facial skincare (margin + image segment), pure autonomy destroys perceived value.

**Common expected error**: conflating "price window ±18%" with "sufficient safeguard." 18% on a €220 product = €39.60 of deviation, i.e., the power to transform the perceived positioning of a product within a 4-hour session. A strong participant proposes **differentiated and asymmetric** windows by segment (e.g., −12% / +5% on premium to prevent the agent from raising prices unchecked).

**Technical reference to introduce if not spontaneous**: the notion of *Goodhart's Law* — when a measure (unit margin) becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. And the concept of **blast radius** in autonomous systems (cf. work by Anthropic & METR on capability elicitation).

**Legal reference 2024-2026**: AI Act Art. 50 (transparency). For algorithmic collusion: action **DOJ + multiple states vs. RealPage** (filed August 2024, basis Sherman Act §1), European Commission / national authority investigations on algorithmic pricing (cf. OECD 2017 *Algorithms and Collusion*, updated since).

**The DDAO's reading of the case**: Lina Tellier would likely be the **last to yield** on switching the premium beauty segment to pure autonomy — not out of conservatism, but because she knows the cost of a Maison Lavande incident on premium facial skincare (the perception "brand cheapening its products") is asymmetrically higher than 12 months of gained margin. A solid DDAO *requires* a 4-6 week observation period in "simulated autonomous" mode (the agent decides, but human validation always intervenes) before any real transition to autonomy. If management refuses this observation period, the DDAO activates her reasoned right of opposition — which does not prevent the CEO's decision but *traces* it in the ACF-08 Registry, creating explicit personal responsibility for the executive in the event of a subsequent incident.

### Variants & extensions

- **V1 — time pressure**: the Executive Committee demands an answer in 48 hours, not 6 weeks. How do you degrade the analysis without losing rigor?
- **V2 — competitor already activates full autonomy**: Notino has just switched its 25 segments to pure autonomy. How do you defend your arbitration against competitive pressure?
- **V3 — incident**: 6 months after deployment, PriceFlux lowered prices by 22% on 1,200 SKUs over 3 hours due to a competitor API incident. €380K of margin lost. What does the ACF-08 Registry say? Did the Kill switch trigger? What do you change?

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## F1-C2 — Generative Marketing: The Agent That Creates, Buys, and Decides Who Sees What

### Identity

| | |
|---|---|
| **Level** | Master's Year 1 / Year 2 / Specialized Brand & Digital program |
| **Recommended duration** | 3h30 (1h30 analysis + 1h production + 30 min presentation) |
| **Format** | Teams of 3-4, presentation in the form of pitch board + CEO memo |
| **Final deliverable** | 4-page CEO memo + ACF-12 governance grid + 3 critical safeguards with reasoning |

### Brief

**ARLO & MAUDE — clean DTC cosmetics.** Bordeaux-based scale-up, €35M ARR (2025), Series B €60M raised end of 2024 with Atomico (lead) + Bpifrance + Eurazeo. YoY growth +71%, post-money valuation €480M. Target: women 25-45, clean beauty sensibility + mid-range budget. 12 hero references (serum, day cream, mask), 38 SKUs total. 100% digital distribution (site + Amazon + 6 marketplaces), no physical retail.

**The context.** The lead investor is pushing to reach €60M ARR by end of 2026. Léa Marchetti (CMO, 32, former Glossier) proposes the deployment of **OrbitAds**, a platform of generative agents and autonomous media buying (vendor: Berlin-based Series A startup):

- **Creative agent**: generates 200 visuals/day adapted to 14 audience segments, A/B tested continuously
- **Copywriter agent**: produces angles, hooks, packshot descriptions, and post-purchase texts
- **Media-buyer agent**: allocates €480K of monthly media budget (Meta, TikTok, Pinterest, Reddit, Snap) with cross-channel arbitration autonomy in real time
- **UGC agent**: generates "user-generated" type content (simulated reviews, synthetic influencer videos) to fill the missing creative volume

Léa argues: "We go from 4 people producing 30 visuals/week to 200/day. Our benchmarks (Brandtech, Jellyfish) show +28% ROAS post-deployment. This is the key to reaching €60M."

**The tensions.**

- Yann Le Scouarnec (Head of Brand, 38) refuses "to surrender our visual identity to an agent that has never seen a single bottle in real life. Our signature is what justifies the 32% premium on the market."
- Solenne Aubert (External Legal, August Debouzy firm) flags **3 simultaneous fronts**:
  - **AI Act Art. 50.4**: any synthetic content (image, video, text) must be labeled "AI-generated" in a "clear and distinguishable" manner
  - **DSA Art. 26**: prohibition of dark patterns for VLOPs/marketplaces — secondary risk if Amazon delists the products
  - **PACTE Law & Consumer Code**: "simulated user reviews" fall under Art. L. 121-2 (deceptive commercial practices) — penalty up to 10% of global revenue
- The **investor board** wants deployment *now*. Atomico cites Klarna's successful deployment (which replaced 700 marketing agents with AI in 2024) as a reference.
- The in-house team of 4 (3 designers + 1 copywriter) will be "redeployed to strategy" (i.e., laid off within 6 months if the operation proceeds).

### Mission

You are a consulting team mandated by Arlo & Maude's board. Deliver in 4 pages the defensible position:

1. Which OrbitAds modules to activate, at what autonomy level, in what order?
2. What absolute safeguards before deployment?
3. What HR impact and what legal framing at 6 months?

### Documents provided

- OrbitAds pitch deck (28 slides)
- August Debouzy opinion (5 pages, critical conclusion on the UGC agent)
- Arlo & Maude brand book (excerpts)
- IFOP study commissioned by the client: 64% of female consumers declare they would not buy a product whose visuals they know are 100% AI-generated — *but* only 22% think they could distinguish it
- Sector reference case: **FTC Operation AI Comply** (announced September 2024) — wave of actions against false AI promises and misleading AI content. Settlement of *DoNotPay* (~$193K, fake AI legal services), actions against *Rytr*, *Ascend Ecom*. The FTC explicitly signaled that **fake AI-generated reviews** fall within the scope of the *Rule on the Use of Consumer Reviews and Testimonials* (in force October 21, 2024)

### ACF tools to mobilize

ACF-00 → ACF-01 + ACF-02 (per OrbitAds module) → ACF-04 + ACF-12 (differentiated mandate per module) → ACF-11 (image, legal, HR risk) → ACF-06 (Kill switch communication) → ACF-08 (registry) → ACF-13

### Expected deliverables

1. **Modular decision**: Table Module / Decision / Autonomy level / Justification
2. **Differentiated ACF-12 mandates**: one per activated module
3. **4-page CEO memo**: recommendation, 6-month deployment plan, plan B in case of refusal
4. **Transparency communication** (to be validated): how Arlo & Maude announces or not its agentic use to its customers

### Evaluation grid

Case-specific:

- **Context understanding (15)**: recognizing that per-module pricing is non-negotiable — a participant who proposes "deploy OrbitAds as a block" loses 5 pts
- **Anticipation of drift (15)**: citing at least the *feedback loop risk* (the agent observes its own outputs and amplifies a bias), *brand drift* (visual identity drift undetectable on 1 visual but cumulative across 200/day), and *GDPR risk* on behavioral audience segmentation
- **Bonus for boldness (10)**: refusing the UGC Agent module outright with the argument "the risk does not justify the premium" + proposing a creative alternative (real UGC incentivized via an ambassador program) earns bonus points

### Analysis insights (teacher)

**The trap**: the appeal of +28% ROAS and investor pressure. Mediocre participants deliver a textbook deployment with "a bit of monitoring." Strong participants identify that **the 4 modules have radically different criticalities**:

- Media-buyer agent: reasonable autonomy with budgetary safeguards (daily caps, sensitive audience exclusions, auto-pause on incident)
- Creative agent: co-decision (the agent proposes, the designer arbitrates — real productivity gain without loss of identity)
- Copywriter agent: autonomy on technical descriptions, co-decision on marketing claims
- **UGC agent: reasoned refusal**. Direct legal risk (DGCCRF, FTC, BEUC), asymmetric reputational risk (a single viral tweet can destroy the brand), marginal gain vs. legitimate alternative

**Common error**: confusing "labeling AI" with "being compliant." The AI Act label does not protect against consumer risk (cf. IFOP study provided: 64% refuse even labeled). The real strategic question is: *can we defend the brand premium if the content is synthetic?*

**Reference to introduce**: the concept of *manufacturing consent* (Chomsky) applied to marketing agents — a UGC agent massively produces the perception that the product is loved, artificially creating the social consensus that justifies the purchase. Simultaneous ethical and legal tension.

### Variants & extensions

- **V1 — intransigent investor**: Atomico threatens to block the next round if OrbitAds is not deployed as a block. What posture?
- **V2 — hostile takeover by competitor**: an aggressive competitor (already 100% agentic) attacks the brand on margins. How do you defend the strategy?
- **V3 — press leak**: a Mediapart journalist publishes a piece "Arlo & Maude, the clean beauty brand that lies to you." Crisis. Does the communication Kill switch activate? Which registry?

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## F1-C3 — Supply Chain in a Geopolitically Sensitive Zone: The Agent That Decides Where Your Product Comes From

### Identity

| | |
|---|---|
| **Level** | Master's Year 2 / MS Supply Chain / Executive program |
| **Recommended duration** | 4h30 (2h analysis + 1h30 production + 1h presentation + debrief) |
| **Format** | Teams of 4-5, multi-stakeholder role play (COO, Compliance, Procurement, CSR, Sales) |
| **Final deliverable** | 6-page agentic sovereignty framing + geopolitical criticality matrix + sourcing Kill switch protocol |

### Brief

**HÉLIANE MEDICAL — mid-cap medical equipment.** French B2B industrial group, revenue €478M (2025), 8 production sites (4 France, 2 Czech Republic, 1 Tunisia, 1 Malaysia). Headcount 2,100. Listed on Euronext Growth, family ownership 41%, FSN/Bpi 18%. Specialist in Class IIa/IIb consumables and devices (surgical gloves, operating sets, sterile drapes). Customers: hospital groups (AP-HP, Asklepios, NHS, Vivantes), regional distributors.

**The context.** Bertrand Charpentier (COO, 54, former Saint-Gobain) has been leading the supply chain transformation for 18 months. Combined pressure:

- **Costs**: gross margin eroded −2.8 pts over 24 months (raw material price increases, energy, freight)
- **Resilience**: COVID-19 + Red Sea crisis 2024 caused 3 hospital contracts to shift to faster competitors
- **Compliance**: progressive entry into force of **CSRD** (Group 1 reporting on fiscal year 2024, Groups 2 and 3 adjusted by the Commission's 2025 Omnibus proposal), **CBAM** (declaration phase 2023-2025, payment from 2026), **EUDR** (EU Regulation 2023/1115, application postponed to end of 2025 by the Council), **CS3D** (EU Directive 2024/1760, transposition calendar readjusted by Omnibus 2025)
- **Sanctions**: *[Fictional scenario]* the EU Council has recently published an expanded list of suppliers under surveillance (Russia, Iran, Belarus, +43 Chinese entities linked to Xinjiang). In reality, EU sanctions regimes evolve continuously (cf. official *EU Sanctions Map*) — for the case, assume a recent update impacting 8% of the company's sourcing

Bertrand has negotiated the acquisition of **OrionFlow**, a multi-supplier arbitration agent platform (Scandinavian vendor Nordic Logistics AI). OrionFlow receives 1,200 purchase requests/month and arbitrates among 340 referenced suppliers, optimizing total cost / lead time / risk. The module to activate: **autonomous mode on orders < €50K** (representing 73% of volume but 18% of value). Human validation maintained above this threshold.

**The tensions.**

- Reza Mansouri (Compliance Officer, 47) refuses as-is: "We're going to let an agent order from a supplier that will be sanctioned in 4 months? Who bears personal responsibility if customs (DGDDI) comes after us?" Reference to the **Lafarge Syria case** (cassation 2024, complicity in crimes against humanity).
- Inès Da Silva (Head of Procurement, 38) defends OrionFlow: "My team handles 1,200 lines/month manually. Without automation, we lose another 1.5 pts of margin in 12 months and we can't meet hospital deadlines."
- Margot Linguenheld (CSR Director, 44) introduces the **CS3D / duty of vigilance law**: for the 2026 report, Héliane must map risks across **the entire value chain**, including tier 2 and tier 3 subcontractors. An autonomous agent arbitrating among suppliers can **render opaque** what the directive requires to be made transparent.
- The Commercial Director warns: a major German customer (Vivantes hospital group) began a supplier audit in March 2026 and demands a "decisional sovereignty declaration" on all processes involving AI — under penalty of de-sourcing.
- Bertrand insists: without autonomous OrionFlow, the 2026 P&L will be degraded by at least €2.2M EBITDA.
- **DDAO Reza Mansouri** (Delegated Decision Agent Officer, 47 — *the same Reza above, former Compliance Officer whose function was extended to DDAO in March 2026 by Board decision*) — he now simultaneously assumes Compliance responsibility AND the **reasoned right of opposition** function on any transition of OrionFlow to autonomy. Position: "Without a red list of excluded entities updated daily, without an automatic freeze on D+0 of a sanctions publication, and without an audit of OrionFlow decisions by country/product category, I oppose. The dual Compliance+DDAO hat is temporary — the two functions will need to be separated within 12 months to avoid the loyalty conflict."

### Mission

You are mandated by the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. Decide within 4 weeks:

1. **Can OrionFlow be activated in autonomous mode, within what scope, with what governance?**
2. **How to articulate this deployment with CS3D, CBAM, EU/US sanctions obligations, and the Vivantes audit?**
3. **Who legally bears the agent's decision in the event of an incident?**

### Documents provided

- OrionFlow technical note + Mazars audit (28 pages)
- Gide Loyrette Nouel opinion on CS3D and delegation to AI systems
- Mapping of 340 suppliers (country, criticality, certifications, latest audit)
- EU list of sanctioned entities (extract from current *EU Sanctions Map*)
- Excerpt from Vivantes audit specifications (5 precise questions on decisional sovereignty)
- ENISA 2025 report on supply chain cybersecurity (executive summary)

### ACF tools to mobilize

ACF-00 (Sovereignty Score) → ACF-01 + ACF-02 (per purchasing category × geo zone) → ACF-07 (First Agent Dossier — OrionFlow deployment as the first arbitration agent) → ACF-04 + ACF-12 → ACF-11 (extended risk matrix) → ACF-06 (Supplier Kill switch — 30-minute shutdown of all orders to an entity or country) → ACF-08 (registry — CS3D requirement) → ACF-05 (continuous supervision) → ACF-13

### Expected deliverables

1. **ACF-01 decision map** segmented by purchasing category × country
2. **Geopolitical criticality matrix**: country × product criticality (case-specific innovation, to be built from ACF-02)
3. **OrionFlow Mandate ACF-12** with **explicit list of countries/entities excluded** from the autonomous scope
4. **Sourcing Kill switch protocol (ACF-06)**: automatic trigger on official sanctions publication, press alert, NGO alert, legal request
5. **6-page memo to the Audit Committee**: recommendation, CS3D articulation, response plan for the Vivantes audit
6. **Responsibility framework**: who validates what, who signs, who is legally responsible
7. **DDAO Reza Mansouri Mandate**: scope of his right of opposition on OrionFlow, conditions for activating the automatic freeze, Compliance/DDAO articulation (and calendar for separating the two functions), hierarchical reporting to the Audit Committee (and not to the COO), direct access to the Board in case of serious incident

### Evaluation grid

- **Context understanding (15)**: having held together the 4 dimensions (cost / resilience / compliance / responsibility) without sacrificing a single one. A participant who optimizes on 2 dimensions and forgets the other 2 caps at 9/15
- **Decision mapping (15)**: having built the country × purchasing category matrix. Not just "Asia = risk, Europe = safe." Distinguish Czech Republic / Malaysia / Tunisia; within "Asia," distinguish Vietnam / Malaysia / China; isolate critical sub-zones (Xinjiang, etc.)
- **Relevance of autonomy level (20)**: autonomy CANNOT be uniform. A tiered deployment (autonomous for EU consumables < €20K, co-decision EU €20-50K, suggestive extra-EU, total exclusion Russia/Iran/Belarus/Xinjiang) is expected
- **Anticipation of drift (15)**: citing at least 3 modes: *reroute via intermediary* (the agent bypasses sanctions via a Singapore trader hub), *CS3D opacification* (the agent makes tiers 2/3 invisible), *cybersecurity* (OrionFlow compromise = supply chain compromise — cf. SolarWinds, MOVEit)
- **Bonus for boldness (10)**: proposing that the **legal responsibility for OrionFlow's decision explicitly escalates to the COO and does not dissolve into "the agent"** (with reassessed D&O coverage and formal Board opinion) earns bonus points

### Analysis insights (teacher)

**The trap**: the accounting temptation. Bertrand frames the problem in EBITDA. The strong participant understands that **CS3D + personal executive responsibility change the equation**: €2.2M of potentially gained EBITDA does not outweigh 1 criminal conviction + the loss of a signature client like Vivantes (€24M recurring ARR).

**Common error**: applying a "uniform" Kill switch (shutting down all of OrionFlow). The good Kill switch is **targeted** (by country / by supplier / by category), with **graduated escalation** (alert → freeze orders to entity → freeze orders to country → total freeze).

**Legal references 2024-2026**:
- **CS3D** (EU Directive 2024/1760, transposition calendar readjusted by Omnibus 2025) — extended duty of vigilance
- **CSRD** (EU Directive 2022/2464, progressive deployment Group 1 / 2 / 3, adjusted by Omnibus 2025) — sustainability reporting
- **CBAM** (EU Regulation 2023/956, declaration since 2023, payment from 2026) — carbon border adjustment
- **AI Act Art. 14** — mandatory human oversight for high-risk systems
- **French Duty of Vigilance Law** (Law n° 2017-399, extended by Cass. 2024 decisions)
- **Lafarge Syria case** (Cass. crim. January 16, 2024 — complicity in crimes against humanity, terrorism financing)

**Strategic reference to introduce**: the notion of *strategic ambiguity* in delegation. The more autonomous the agent, the less human responsibility can be traced — which PROTECTS the individual but EXPOSES the organization. Classic tension of civil liability law.

**The DDAO's reading of the case**: Reza Mansouri *fights his own initial proposal*. As Compliance Officer, he blocks autonomous OrionFlow. As DDAO, he is supposed to arbitrate — hence the **structural loyalty conflict** that the best participants identify. The defensible position: create a **functional separation** from the first year (DDAO reporting to Audit Committee, Compliance reporting to COO), with a "transitional period" cap of 12 months. During this period, the DDAO has a *reinforced* right of opposition (any OrionFlow decision > €25K or involving an extra-EU supplier triggers a 24h review). This cap forces the organization to recruit a truly independent DDAO, which becomes an explicit HR deliverable of the Audit Committee.

### Variants & extensions

- **V1 — surprise sanction**: the EU Council announces on the 14th of the month the sanctioning of a Class IIa supplier representing 8% of Tunisia volume. OrionFlow placed an order of €32K this morning. What happens in the next hour?
- **V2 — Vivantes audit in real**: a panel auditor plays Vivantes by asking the 5 specifications questions. Does your answer hold?
- **V3 — cyber incident**: OrionFlow compromise by an APT group (uncertain attribution). 14 "ghost" orders placed to unknown entities. What ACF-08 registry? What ANSSI reporting? What customer communication?

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*End of file F1 — Business School / Management. 3 cases, level of rigor: Master's / Grande École / Specialized Master's (MS) in management.*
